This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. (Strong substitutes preferences are also known, in other literatures, as M -concave, matroidal and well-layered maps, and valuated matroids). Our use of the bidding language, and the information it provides, contrasts with existing algorithms that rely on access to a valuation or demand oracle to find equilibrium.
Introduction
This paper develops algorithms that solve product-mix auctions in which participants can make bids that represent any strong-substitutes preferences for an arbitrary number of distinct goods. (These preferences are also known, in other literatures, as M -concave, matroidal and welllayered maps, and valuated matroids). It thus allows bidders to express more general preferences than could previously be permitted in these auctions, and finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities consistent with these, and the auctioneer's preferences.
Importantly, therefore, our algorithms for finding equilibrium differ from existing ones in that they directly use the information that the product-mix auction "language" provides. This information is in a very different form from the information provided by a valuation or demand oracle. This creates additional complexities, as well as simplifications which we can take advantage of. However, the language is conceptually simple, and easy for bidders to use in a (product-mix) auction.
The product-mix auction was developed in 2007-8 for the Bank of England to provide liquidity to financial institutions by auctioning loans to them [Klemperer, 2008] . It is now used at least monthly by the Bank, and more often when institutions are more likely to be under stress. (After the 2016 vote for "Brexit", and starting again on 5th March 2019, for instance, the auction was run weekly.)
The original implementation of the auction allowed bidders to each submit a collection of bids, where each bid has n + 1 elements: a price for each of the n goods available, and a total quantity of goods sought by that bid. 1 Figure 1a gives an example with two bids that each demand a single good, in the case where n = 2.
The auction sets a uniform price for each good (i.e., every recipient of any particular good pays the same price per unit for that good), and gives each bid an allocation that maximises that bid's "utility", assuming quasilinear preferences. That is, each bid is allocated the good on which its price strictly exceeds the auction's price by most, if there is a unique such good, and is allocated nothing if all its prices are strictly below the auction's corresponding prices. (So if a bid only wants one particular good, it simply sets prices of zero for all the other (n − 1) goods.) A bid that creates a tie (i.e., two or more of its prices exceed the auction's corresponding prices by most, or none of its prices exceed, but at least one equals, the auction's corresponding prices) can be allocated in any way consistent with equilibrium (see below).
The auction's prices are chosen to maximise the sum of the bids' and auctioneer's welfare -that is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities. 2 Moreover, the auctioneer expresses his preferences about which goods to allocate in the form of supply functions which can themselves be equivalently represented as (and so can be converted into) a collection of bids of the kind described above. 3 In versions of the product-mix auction thus far implemented, all bids are for positive quantities of goods. In the quasi-linear preferences case, the market-clearing prices can then be found by solving straightforward linear programs, and finding an allocation of the auctioneer's supply to the individual bidders is similarly straightforward. However, as discussed in Klemperer [2008] , some strong-substitutes preferences (over bundles of non-negative quantities of goods) can only be expressed by using collections of bids for both positive and negative quantities; positive and negative bids are required to express the demand correspondence in Figure 1b , for instance. 4 Moreover, there are natural circumstances in which a bidder may wish to express such preferences 5 , and it has been shown that any strong-substitutes preferences can be represented using 1 In the Bank of England's auction, the bidders are commercial banks, etc., each good is a loan secured against one of n different specified qualities of collateral (so the prices are interest rates), and the quantity is the amount of the loan (in £).
2 Specifically, the auction finds the lowest such price vector. Since the bids automatically express "strong substitutes" preferences for all bidders (see Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b] ), there exist equilibrium price vectors, and also a unique one among them at which every good's price is lowest.
3 See Appendix 1E of Klemperer [2018] for how to convert supply functions into collections of bids. (The bids that the auctioneer's supply functions would be converted into would ensure that it sells more units on a good when prices are high, analogous to a buyer buying fewer units in this case.) Although the auctioneer's preferences could equivalently have been represented as a collection of bids of the kind made by the bidders, describing them simply as two-dimensional graphs of "supply schedules" was an important feature of the auction design: participants' ability to express their preferences in the ways that are most natural for them is crucial to getting an auction accepted for practical use, to getting bidders to participate, and to the auction working efficiently.
The Bank of England's original program restricted to n = 2. Since 2014 its program permits much larger n (it is currently being run with n = 3), and it also allows richer forms of preferences to be expressed by the auctioneer (but not by the bidders, whose preference expression has, by contrast, been restricted in recent auctions). A variant that allowed for bidders' budget constraints (hence non-quasilinear preferences) was programmed for the Government of Iceland in 2015-16. See Klemperer [2008 Klemperer [ , 2010 Klemperer [ , 2018 and Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b] for full discussion. 4 Strong-substitutes preferences are those that would be ordinary substitutes preferences if we treated every unit of every good as a separate good. Such preferences have many attractive properties; they mean, for example, that if the price of any one good increases, and the demand for it decreases, then the demand for all other goods can increase by at most the amount of that decrease. Strong substitutability is equivalent to M -concavity [Shioura and Tamura, 2015] . See Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] for a discussion of the relationship between "strong" and "ordinary" substitutes.
5 See Klemperer [2008] . Such preferences were not relevant to the Bank of England's application (see Klemperer collections of positive and negative bids. 6 The use of the product-mix bidding language to express preferences is, thus, both conceptually simple and natural. The algorithms presented in this paper exploit the fact that it allows for the efficient computation of a demanded bundle as well as the indirect utility derived at any given prices. On the other hand, computing the aggregate value of a given bundle is not straightforward using the information that the bidding language provides.
Conversely, we note that Murota [2003] and others work in a valuation oracle setting, which assumes that we have access to bidder preferences only through oracle access to the valuations of each bidder. This setting provides no straightforward way to compute a demanded bundle or the indirect utility function at given prices. Our bidding-language setting is somewhat analogous to but more informative than the demand oracle setting of Ausubel [2006] and Paes Leme and Wong [2017] , which presupposes access to an oracle returning a demanded bundle at given prices.
Our contributions This paper addresses the computational challenges of determining uniform component-wise minimal market-clearing prices (at which total market demands equal the quantities of each good that are available) and allocating a fixed collection of the goods at these prices, to bidders whose bids are collections of positive and negative bids that express strong-substitute preferences.
Section 2 introduces the product-mix auction's strong-substitutes bidding language in more detail, and develops some of its properties. A first contribution of our paper is to show that it is co-NP-complete to determine whether a given list of positive and negative bids constitute a valid demand correspondence.
In Section 3, we consider algorithms for finding component-wise minimal market-clearing prices that have practical running time bounds (ruling out the ellipsoid method, which can in principle be applied [Paes Leme and Wong, 2017] ). We adopt a discrete steepest descent method from the discrete optimisation literature [Murota, 2003 , Shioura, 2017 that employs submodular minimisation to find the steepest descent directions and present two techniques that reduce the number of iterations required by taking long steps in the steepest descent direction. For both techniques we see that the number of iterations is polynomial in the input size and, since submodular minimisation is rapid in practice [Chakrabarty et al., 2017] , we expect our approach to have a fast running time. Indeed, preliminary experiments suggest our method performs well in practice.
Our main contribution, given in Section 4, is an efficient polynomial-time algorithm that allocates the auctioneer's chosen supply among the bidders at given market-clearing prices. The difficulty in developing this lies in handling bids whose utility is maximised on more than one alternative good (or whose utility from its most-preferred good is exactly zero), as tie-breaking choices interact with each other. This gives rise to a novel matching problem. Our algorithm proceeds by iteratively simplifying the allocation problem at hand, allocating unambiguous bids and perturbing bids and prices in a way that resolves a subset of the tie-breaks and yields a simplified allocation problem. Progress is measured in terms of reductions in the number of edges of a multigraph associated with the allocation problems.
Our price-finding and allocation algorithms are conceptually simple. They are also straightforward to implement, which has allowed us to develop two practical implementations in Haskell and Python; these can be found at http://pma.nuff.ox.ac.uk. and https://github.com/ edwinlock/product-mix, respectively. Appendix A presents the results of experiments demonstrating that our allocation algorithm is efficient in practice for realistic numbers of goods, bidders and bids.
2018).
Related work Our work continues a long literature, spanning economics and discrete convex analysis, on "gross" and "strong substitutes" [Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Milgrom and Strulovici, 2009] and "M -concavity" [Murota and Shioura, 1999] . While the discrete convex analysis literature generally allows multiple units of each good, much focus in economics has been on the case in which there is only one unit of each good; Milgrom and Strulovici [2009] showed that "strong substitutes" provide the suitable generalisation of gross substitutes to the multi-unit case, retaining existence of equilibrium while insisting that any two units of the same good should have the same price.
Algorithms to compute equilibrium prices in these contexts go back to Kelso and Crawford [1982] , Murota [2000] and Ausubel [2006] ; see Shioura and Tamura [2015] , Murota [2016] and Paes Leme [2017] for recent surveys. Market-clearing prices are commonly found either by performing a discrete steepest-descent search or by solving a convex optimisation by means of an improved cutting plane method of Lee et al. [2015] (cf. Paes Leme and Wong [2017] ). We note that to the best of our knowledge, the cutting plane method has not yet been implemented and may be computationally expensive in practice; moreover, solving the convex optimisation problem is not guaranteed to find component-wise minimal prices. While the steepest-descent methods described in the literature run in pseudo-polynomial time in the valuation and demand oracle settings, as compared to the fully polynomial algorithm of Paes Leme and Wong [2017] , our steepest descent algorithm uses long steps and exploits the bid representation of bidder demand to close this gap, yielding a competitive fully polynomial algorithm in the bidding-language setting.
Significantly, whereas previous literature has developed algorithms for finding market-clearing prices, few have addressed the (harder) problem of finding a valid allocation of goods, given those prices. One such work is Murota [2003] , which presents an algorithm that works in the multiunit case by reducing the allocation problem to a network flow problem and relies on oracle access to the valuation function of each bidder. Paes Leme and Wong [2017] provides a different algorithm, also in the valuation oracle setting, but this is only applicable in the case in which there is only one unit of each good. We elaborate on this in Section 2.4.
As the computation of a bidder's valuation of a given bundle is expensive in our biddinglanguage setting, running the algorithm of Murota [2003] to solve the allocation problem for product-mix auctions would incur a significant cost for each query to the valuation oracle. In contrast, our algorithms directly exploit the specific representation provided by the product-mix auction's bidding language to find both prices and allocations.
Preliminaries
For notational convenience, we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n} and [n] 0 := {0, . . . , n}. In our auction model, there are n distinct goods numbered from 1 to n; a single copy of a good is an item. A bundle of goods, typically denoted by x, y or z in this paper, is a vector in Z n whose i-th entry denotes the number of items of good i. The target bundle t is a bundle the auctioneer wants to allocate amongst the bidders. Vectors p, q ∈ R n typically denote vectors of prices, with a price entry for each of the n goods. We write p ≤ q when the inequality holds component-wise. It is often convenient to regard a rejected bid as being accepted on a notional "reject" good for which bids and prices are always zero. Letting the reject good be 0, the set of goods is then [n] 0 . In this setting, we identify bundles and prices with the n + 1-dimensional vectors obtained by adding a 0-th entry of value 0.
A valuation u is a function that maps bundles to non-negative real numbers. We assume that bidders have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. the utility derived from bundle x at price p by a bidder with valuation u is given by
Any valuation u is associated with a demand correspondence D u that maps p to the set of bundles that maximise (1). We omit the subscript u if the intended valuation is clear from context. For any subset X ⊆ [n], e X denotes the characteristic vector of X, i.e. an n-dimensional vector whose i-th entry is 1 if i ∈ X, 0 otherwise. Furthermore, e i denotes the vector whose i-th entry is 1 and other entries are 0.
A set function f :
is the task of finding a minimiser of a submodular function. It is well-known that the minimisers of submodular functions form a lattice; that is, if S and T are minimisers of f , then so are S ∪T and S ∩T . SFM can be solved in polynomial time using the improved cutting plane method of Lee et al. [2015] . For SFM that is efficient in practice, we refer to two SFM algorithms from the literature. The subgradient descent approach by Chakrabarty et al. [2017] determines a minimiser in time O(nF 3 γ log n), while the Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm described by Chakrabarty et al. [2014] takes time O(F 2 (n 2 γ + n 3 )), where F is an upper bound on the absolute value of f and γ denotes the time it takes to query f . Experimental results [Chakrabarty et al., 2014] indicate that the running time of the Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm depends less on F than suggested by the above bound.
For the price-finding algorithms described in Section 3, we require a subroutine that finds the inclusion-wise minimal minimiser. Note that such a subroutine can be obtained by calling any SFM algorithm n + 1 times. Indeed, let S be a minimiser of f and, for every v ∈ S, let S v be the submodular minimiser of the function f restricted to [n] \ {v}. Then if S 0 denotes the minimal minimiser of f , we have v ∈ S 0 if and only if f (S v ) > f (S), as the minimisers of a submodular function form a lattice. Hence, we obtain
Strong substitutes valuation functions
In this paper, we assume that bidders have strong substitutes valuations. We review some basic properties of strong-substitutes (SS) valuations. A SS valuation divides price space into regions corresponding to bundles: any bundle x has a price region where x is demanded, possibly along with other bundles (see Figure 1) . It is known [Murota, 2003, Theorem 11.16 ] that each such region is a convex lattice. When a demand region for some bundle x has full dimensionality, in its interior x is the only bundle demanded; we call this interior a unique demand region (UDR). Definition 2.1. A valuation u is ordinary substitutes if, for any prices p ≥ p with D u (p) = {x} and D u (p ) = {x }, we have x k ≥ x k for all k such that p k = p k . A valuation u is strong substitutes (SS) if, when we consider every unit of every good to be a separate good, u is ordinary substitutes.
Definition 2.1 for strong substitutes is equivalent to the definition of Milgrom and Strulovici [2009] and also to M -concavity [Murota and Shioura, 1999] : see footnote 4. It is equivalent to gross substitutes (GS) [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] if there is only one item of each good.
While GS guarantees that a competitive equilibrium exists in single-unit auction markets, the condition is not sufficient for the existence of such an equilibrium in the multi-unit case (Shioura and Tamura 2015 give an example). SS represents a generalisation of single-unit GS that provides a general sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium. We refer to Shioura and Tamura [2015] for a detailed discussion on the distinction between GS and SS valuations.
Definition 2.2. The indirect utility function f u of valuation u maps a price vector p to the utility that a bidder with demand D u has for receiving her preferred bundle at a given price vector p in the following way.
We note that the indirect utility function of SS valuations is convex, piecewise-linear and continuous. Example of strong-substitutes demand correspondences with two goods {1,2} belonging to two bidders, Alice and Bob. Positive and negative bids are denoted by solid and hollow circles, respectively. Price space is divided into regions corresponding to demanded bundles (x 1 , x 2 ), with x i denoting the number of items of good i. At p = (4, 4), Alice demands {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 2)} and Bob demands {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, the discrete convex hulls of bundles demanded in the regions surrounding p.
Representing strong substitutes valuations with weighted bids
We describe how every strong substitutes valuation function can be represented by a finite list B of positive and negative bids. A bid consists of an n-dimensional vector b ∈ Z n and a weight w(b) = ±1. 7 In this section we define a demand correspondence D B mapping each price vector p to a set of bundles demanded at p, and an indirect utility function f B associated with B. A bid b demands good i ∈ [n] 0 if the surplus b i − p i at price p is maximal, that is if we have i ∈ arg max i∈[n] 0 (b i − p i ); recall that good 0 is the notional "reject" good. We say that arg max i∈[n] 0 (b i − p i ) is the set of demanded goods of b at p. A bid b is marginal (on the set of its demanded goods) at p if b demands more than one good at p. We say that a price p is marginal if there are bids marginal at p and non-marginal otherwise.
Define the demand correspondence D B (p) at prices p as follows. If p is non-marginal, the unique bundle demanded at p is obtained by adding an amount w(b) of i(b) to the bundle for each b ∈ B, where i(b) is good b demands at p. If p is marginal, D B (p) consists of the discrete convex hull of the bundles demanded at non-marginal prices arbitrarily close to p, where the discrete convex hull of a set of bundles X is defined as conv(X) ∩ Z. In general, this implies that we cannot independently allocate to bids one of the goods they demand, as this may result in bundles that are not in D B (p). (In Figure 1b we see that at prices p = (4, 4), allocating the negative bid a negative item of good 1, the positive bid at (4,2) a positive item of good 1 and the other two positive bids a positive item of good 2 leads to a total bundle of (0, 2) ∈ D B (p).)
The indirect utility function f B associated with B is given by
From (3) it is clear that we can compute f B (p) efficiently. In our setting, it is also straightforward to compute a bundle demanded at a given price p. This demand oracle problem is noted in Paes Leme [2017] as an algorithmic primitive needed to implement the Walrasian tâtonnement procedure. If p is non-marginal, simply allocate each bid a positive or negative item of its demanded good and add up the items to obtain the demanded bundle. If p is marginal, care must be taken to accept bids in a consistent way; one way to do this is to perturb entries of the price vector slightly so as to break ties, then note that the resulting bundle is demanded at the unperturbed prices. Note that a demand oracle does not provide us with a way to tell whether a given bundle of interest is demanded at p.
A result by Baldwin and Klemperer [2019b] shows that any SS demand correspondence can be represented as a finite list of positive and negative dot bids, and this representation is essentially unique (up to redundancies). Conversely, however, not all lists of positive and negative bids induce a strong substitutes valuation function. We call a bid list valid if the indirect utility function f B defined in (3) is convex; Theorem 2.3 gives two further equivalent characterisations of validity. The proof is given in Appendix B. In Section 4, we will also introduce a weaker local notion of validity by introducing local validity in the ε-neighbourhood of a price p.
Theorem 2.3. Let B be a list of positive and negative bids and f B be the associated utility function as defined in (3). The following conditions are equivalent.
1. B is valid.
2. There is no price vector p and pair of distinct goods i, i ∈ [n] 0 at which the weights of the bids marginal on i and i sum to a negative number.
3. f B is the indirect utility function of a strong substitutes valuation with quasi-linear utilities.
Deciding validity of bid lists
In our auction, bidders submit their lists of positive and negative bids to the auctioneer prior to the auction. We show in Theorem 2.4 that checking the validity of a given list of bids is computationally hard. The proof (in Appendix C) exploits definition (2) of validity in Theorem 2.3.
Theorem 2.4. The problem of deciding the validity of a given list of positive and negative bids is co-NP-complete.
However, in Appendix C we present a simple algorithm that verifies the validity of a given list of bids; Theorem C.11 shows that its running time is polynomial if the number of goods, or the number of negative bids, is bounded by a constant. Furthermore, many useful subclasses of sets of bids (of arbitrary size) are easily checkable for validity in practice. Hence, while the co-NP-completeness result is disappointing, it does not seem to be an important limitation on the auction, as sensible restrictions on the permitted bids can allow us to check validity efficiently in practice.
The computational challenges
In this subsection we state the computational problems to be solved. For any bidder j ∈ J, where J is the set of bidders, B j denotes the bids of bidder j. We assume each B j is valid, as defined in Section 2.2, and provided as a list of vectors encoded in binary. Let B be the aggregate list of bids obtained by aggregating the lists of all bidders. As the aggregation of strong substitutes valuation functions is strong substitutes, B is valid. (Figure 2a depicts the aggregate bid list of Alice and Bob from Figure 1 .) The running times of our algorithms will be given in terms of n, |J|, |B| and M := max b∈B b ∞ , the maximum bid vector entry.
Suppose the auctioneer intends to sell target bundle t. Our aim is to compute a competitive equilibrium. That is, a market-clearing price p at which t is demanded and an allocation of t to the various bidders so that every bidder receives a bundle they demand at p. In the event that not enough bids are made for the target bundle available, some items can go unsold, which is equivalent to the auctioneer buying them back from the market. To reflect this, the auctioneer places a total of t 1 positive bids at 0. 8 The challenge of computing a competitive equilibrium can be separated into two problems.
1. The price-finding problem. Given the aggregate bid list B and target bundle t, find the coordinate-wise minimal market-clearing price p at which t is demanded, that is t ∈ D B (p).
2. The allocation problem. Given a valid bid list B j for each bidder j ∈ J, a target bundle t and market-clearing price p, allocate t to the bidders so that each bidder receives a bundle they demand at p, that is, a partition (t j ) j∈J of t with t j ∈ D B j for all j ∈ J.
Note that we do not ask for a breakdown of which of j's bids are accepted on which goods. 9 Indeed, we show that a solution to the allocation problem can be obtained without this knowledge.
Theorem 2.5 (Danilov et al. 2001) . (see also Murota 2003 and Milgrom and Strulovici 2009) Suppose that each bidder j ∈ J has SS demand correspondence D j , and let D be the aggregate demand from all bidders. Given a target allocation t and a market-clearing price p for t, there exists a partition t = j∈J t j such that t j ∈ D j (p).
Theorem 2.5 ensures that if the target bundle t is aggregately demanded at market-clearing price p, then there exists an allocation of t among the bidders so that every bidder receives a bundle she demands. However, care must be taken in finding such an allocation, as bidders cannot simply be allocated an arbitrary bundle they demand at the market-clearing price. (Indeed, in Figure 1 the lowest prices at which Alice and Bob aggregately demand (1, 1) is given by p = (4, 4). If we allocate Alice the whole bundle (1, 1), Bob does not demand the empty remainder (0, 0) at p.)
Working in the valuation oracle setting, Paes Leme and Wong [2017] present an algorithm that solves the allocation problem if there exist prices at which the target bundle is uniquely demanded. Such prices are guaranteed in the single-unit case (i.e. when there is only one unit of every good) but need not exist in the multi-unit case. (Indeed, the bundle (1, 1) is not uniquely demanded at any prices for the aggregate demand correspondence of Alice and Bob defined in Figure 1 , and shown in Figure 2a .)
If we had (oracle) access to the valuations of the bidders, we could perturb the valuations such that the target bundle is uniquely demanded at some price by subtracting carefully constructed functions that are discrete-convex in one variable. 10 However, recall that our bidding language does not give straightforward access to bidder valuations. 11 Moreover, is not clear how to perturb the bids individually to achieve a suitable "indirect" perturbation of the valuations. Instead, our allocation algorithm takes the approach of perturbing bids bidder by bidder.
Some intuition can be gained by considering the addition of a small "random" perturbation vector v j to all the bids in bid set B j (a different v j for each j ∈ J) and recomputing the new market-clearing prices. This has the effect of breaking ties between bids in two different bid sets. (This also uses the plausible fact, established in Proposition 4.14, that small perturbations 8 Of course, any positive reserve price can reflected by appropriately locating the auctioneer's bids. 9 Once a partition of t has been obtained, it is easy to compute such a breakdown since the task can be formulated as a maximum network flow problem, in which each positive bid b is a source node with outgoing flow given by its weight w(b). There are n + 1 intermediate nodes, one node vi for each good i, including the "reject" good 0. Connect each positive bid node to the goods on which it may be accepted. Each vi is connected to a sink node whose incoming flow is the i-th element of t j . (For i = 0 the incoming flow is given by the total weight of bids minus the number of elements of t j .) Each negative bid b is a sink node whose flow is its weight w(b), and is connected to any vi for which b demands good i.
10 See Murota (2003) Theorem 6.13 (4). 11 To the best of our knowledge, the most efficient way to compute the valuation of bundle x is to determine a price p at which x is demanded using our price-finding algorithm from Section 3, computing the indirect utility fB(p) at this price and then solving (2) for u(x). make only small changes to the market clearing price(s).) However, the perturbations need to be exponentially small in order to ensure that all possible ties are broken. (One can check, noting the pigeonhole principle, that if perturbations are multiples of some inverse-polynomial, then they will have distinct subsets having the same sum, losing the guarantee that all possible ties are broken.) Our algorithm of Section 4 avoids this by systematically perturbing and un-perturbing bid sets, making decisions on marginal bids as it proceeds.
A desideratum that we do not address here is fairness of allocation, in the sense that equal bidders should be treated equally. Note that this is in conflict with our requirement that bids should be allocated entirely or not at all: in the simplest configuration where two bidders offer the same price for a single available item, one of those bidders will have their bid allocated and other will not.
Finding market-clearing prices
We discuss two iterative steepest descent algorithms MinUp and LongStepMinUp from Shioura [2017] that determine a minimal minimiser of an L -convex function. Both algorithms use the SFM subroutine described in Section 2 to find the component-wise minimal discrete steepest descent direction. For the second algorithm, we present two methods of computing step lengths and show that both methods yield a polynomial running time in our bidding-language setting.
In order to apply the steepest descent method to our price-finding problem, we define a Lyapunov function g and note in Proposition 3.1 that its restriction to Z n + is L -convex. Moreover, Lemma 3.2 states that the lowest market-clearing price is integral and finding it reduces to determining the minimal minimiser of g. This approach generalises an algorithm used by Ausubel's ascending auction design [Ausubel, 2006] and in Gul et al. [2000] for the task of finding an equilibrium price in single-unit markets.
The Lyapunov function with regard to utility function f u and target bundle t is defined as g t (p) := f u (p)+t.p. We suppress the subscript t if it is clear from context. Using our knowledge of the aggregate bid list B and (3), we can write g t as
From (4) it is clear that we can evaluate g at any price p in time O(n|B|). A function f : Z n → R is L -convex if it satisfies the translation submodularity property,
Here, ∨ and ∧ denote the component-wise maximum and minimum, respectively. The following proposition and lemma demonstrate that we can use algorithms for minimising L -convex functions to find the minimal price p * at which t is demanded.
Proof. It is known that the indirect utility function f u restricted to Z n is L -convex if and only if the valuation function u is strong substitutes (cf. Theorem 7.1 in Shioura and Tamura 2015.) Secondly, note that
Together with the L -convexity of f u and rewriting g(x) as f u (x) + t.x for all occurrences of g in (5), this implies that g is L -convex.
Lemma 3.2. The Lyapunov function g with regard to a valid (integral) bid list and any target bundle t is convex, and p is a minimiser of g if and only if it is a market-clearing price for target bundle t. Moreover, the minimal minimiser of g is integral.
Proof. The first statement is immediate from the fact that f B is convex and t.p is a linear term. To see the second statement, note that for any market-clearing price p of target bundle t, we have g(p) = u(t), whereas for any price p at which t is not demanded, we have
Here u is the valuation function as defined in Section 2 and we use (2). Finally, the integrality of the minimal minimiser of g follows from the fact that if t is demanded at p, then t is also demanded at p . To see this, fix a bid b and note that if b demands good i at p, it still demands i at p . Indeed, as b demands i at p, we have
Due to the integrality of the bids and prices in p , this implies
Let p be a point that is dominated by some minimiser of g. Shioura [2017] noted that p minimises g if and only if g(p) ≤ g(p + e S ) for every S ⊆ [n]. For any integral point p ∈ Z n + and S ⊆ [n], let the slope function g (p; S) := g(p + e S ) − g(p) denote the amount by which p decreases when moving in the direction of e S . If S minimises g (p; S), we call e S a steepest descent direction. For any integral vector p, the L -convexity of g implies that g (p; S) is an integral submodular function [Murota and Shioura, 2014, Theorem 7 .2] and hence there exists a unique component-wise minimal steepest descent direction e S 0 .
Let p * be the minimal minimiser of g. If p is dominated by p * and we move in the minimal steepest descent direction, the point p + e S 0 is also dominated by p * . This suggests algorithm MinUp 12 , which iterates a point p by moving by some step e S 0 , all the while remaining dominated by p * , until p = p * .
MinUp
Step 1 Pick a point p ≤ p * .
Step 2 Find the inclusion-wise minimal set S 0 ∈ [n] minimising g (p; S).
Step 3 If S = ∅, return p. Else set p = p + e S and go to Step 2.
By the existence of the auctioneer's reserve bids, we can initialise p to 0. For this starting point, running time analysis by Murota and Shioura [2014] implies that MinUp iterates exactly p * ∞ times. As we know that p * is bounded from above by the component-wise maximum over all bids B, the number of iterations is at most M := max b∈B b ∞ . In each iteration of Step 2, we can determine S 0 using the SFM subroutine described in Section 2 that finds a minimal minimiser of a given function in time T (n). This leads to the following running time for MinUp. We note that the running time of the two practical SFM algorithms mentioned in Section 2 is given with respect to an upper bound on the absolute value of the objective function. In order to provide such an upper bound for our slope function g , observe that the two points p and p + e S share a demanded bundle x, for any p and S ⊆ [n]. As every bid contributes at most one item to t and x, this implies g (p; S) = (t − x)e S ≤ |B|. 
Longer step sizes
The analysis by Murota and Shioura [2014] shows that MinUp performs optimally for an iterative algorithm that is constrained to steps with an L ∞ -size of at most 1. As described by Shioura [2017], we can, however, exploit monotonicity properties of the function g (p; S 0 ) in order to increase step sizes without changing the trajectory of p as the algorithm runs. This reduces the number of SFM subroutine calls, the most expensive part of the algorithm. In particular, if e S 0 denotes the minimal steepest descent direction at p, we take a single long step λe S 0 for some λ ∈ Z + that is equivalent to several consecutive steps of MinUp in the same direction e S 0 . We follow Shioura [2017] in choosing step length
that is, the farthest distance we can move before the slope
in the direction of e S 0 changes. This leads to the following algorithm. 13 Below we will give two methods to compute (6).
LongStepMinUp
Step 1 Pick p ≤ p * .
Step 2 Compute the inclusion-wise minimal minimiser S 0 ⊆ [n] of g (p; S) and λ(p, S 0 ) as defined by (6).
Step 3 If S 0 = ∅, return p. Otherwise set p = p + λ(p, S 0 )e S 0 and go to Step 2.
Note that the values of p follow the same trajectory for MinUp and LongStepMinUp. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.5, which rests on the monotonicity properties of g (p, S 0 ) stated in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4 (Shioura 2017, Theorem 4.16). Let S 0 and S 0 be minimal steepest descent directions at p and p + e S 0 , respectively. Then we have
Lemma 3.5. Let S 0 denote the minimal steepest descent at p and let λ(p, S 0 ) be defined as in (6). Then e S 0 is the minimal steepest descent at p + (λ − 1)e S 0 for any 1 ≤ λ ≤ λ(p, S 0 ).
Shioura [2017] bounds the number of iterations of LongStepMinUp as follows. Note that 0 and e S 0 share a demanded bundle x, so for any S ⊆ [n] we have
as each bid contributes at most one unit to the demanded bundle. This implies that LongStepMinUp takes at most n|B| iterations to find component-wise minimal equilibrium prices.
Computing the step length
Fix a price p and let e S 0 be the component-wise minimal steepest descent direction at p. We describe two methods to compute the step length defined by (6). The first method uses binary search and is also suggested in Shioura [2017] , while second method exploits our knowledge of the bids to determine λ(p; S 0 ). Note that we can evaluate g (p;
Theorem 3.7. The LongStepMinUp algorithm in combination with the binary search and demand change methods has a respective running time of O(n 2 |B| 2 log M + n|B|T (n)) and O(n 2 |B| 3 + n|B|T (n)).
A description of the two methods, as well as a proof of this theorem, is provided below. Note that as the two methods have different running time guarantees, the best method in practice is context-specific.
Binary search Note that λ(p; S 0 ) can be bounded by the total number of unit steps in MinUp, which in turn is bounded by M . By Proposition 3.4, we have that g (p; S 0 ) < g (p + λe S 0 ; S 0 ) implies g (p; S 0 ) < g (p + λ e S 0 ; S 0 ) for all λ > λ. Hence we can apply binary search to find λ(p; S 0 ) in time O(n|B| log M ).
Demand change Alternatively, we can exploit our knowledge of the individual bids to determine λ(p; S 0 ). We proceed by performing a demand-change procedure, which repeatedly determines the highest value µ for which every bid b ∈ B demands the same goods (or a superset thereof) at prices p + µe S 0 that it demands at p + e S 0 and updates p to p + µe S 0 .
Fix a bid b and let I denote the goods it demands at p. If I ⊆ S 0 , then b demands the same set of goods I b = I \ S 0 at all prices p + µ e S 0 with µ ≥ 1. On the other hand, suppose I ⊆ S 0 . We define
, where i is any good in I, and consider the set of goods that b demands at prices p + µ e S 0 with µ ≥ 1. If 1 ≤ µ < µ b , then b demands I, if µ = µ b then b demands a superset of I and if µ > µ b , then b demands none of the goods in I.
We define C to be the set of bids that demand a subset of S 0 at p, and let µ(p, S 0 ) := min b∈C µ b . Note that we can determine the value of µ(p, S 0 ) in time O(n|B|).
The demand-change procedure takes as input a price p 0 := p and direction e S 0 , and consists of the following steps. Initially, we set λ to 0. Compute µ(p, S 0 ), and increment λ by µ(p, S 0 ). If we have λ = λ(p 0 , S 0 ), return λ. Otherwise, increment p by µe S 0 and repeat the above with the same value for e S 0 .
Note that in order to check whether λ = λ(p 0 ; S 0 ), we can compute g (p 0 + µe S 0 ; S 0 ) and verify that g (p 0 + µe S 0 ; S 0 ) = g (0; S 0 ), which takes time O(n|B|). Lemma 3.8 proves that the demand-change procedure correctly computes the value of λ(p; S 0 ) in time O(n|B| 2 ).
Lemma 3.8. The demand-change procedure returns λ(p; S 0 ) in at most |B| iterations.
Proof. Let K denote the number of iterations in the demand-change procedure and let p k , µ k and C k be the values of p, µ(p, S 0 ) and C after the k-th iteration. For notational convenience, let p 0 = p and µ 0 = 0.
Proposition 3.4 implies that it suffices to show
in order to prove the first claim that λ = λ(p, S 0 ). Firstly, note that there is a bundle x that is demanded at p k−1 and p k , as well as all prices in between these two points. Indeed, if a bid b demands good i at p k−1 + e S 0 , then b also demands i at the two prices p k−1 and p k − e S 0 = p k−1 + (µ k − 1)e S 0 , by construction of µ k . Hence, making use of (2), we get
Secondly, note that for every 0 ≤ k < K, we have g (p k − e S 0 ; S 0 ) = g (p k ; S 0 ), and for the last iteration K we have g (p K − e S 0 ; S 0 ) < g (p K ; S 0 ). This implies (7). Now we turn to the second claim, that K ≤ |B|. This follows from the fact that C k−1 C k and |C 0 | ≤ |B|. Indeed, if b ∈ C k−1 , then b demands goods I ⊆ S 0 at p k−1 and I b = I \S 0 at any prices p k−1 + µe S 0 for any µ ≥ 1, so b ∈ C k . Now suppose b ∈ C k−1 is a bid for which µ k−1 = µ b (at p k−1 ). Then we claim that b ∈ C k . Indeed, the demanded goods I of b at p + (µ b + 1)e S 0 satisfy I ⊆ S 0 by construction of µ b . By the same argument as above, b demands goods not in S 0 at all prices p + µe S 0 with µ ≥ µ b + 1.
Some practical improvements
The computation time of MinUp and LongStepMinUp is dominated by the task of finding a minimal set S 0 minimising g (p; S) using SFM. In practice, we can exploit our direct access to the bids to speed up the computation of S 0 by decreasing the dimensionality of the submodular function to be minimised. The following observations can be seen as a special case of observations by Ausubel [2006] . Fix p ∈ Z n + and let e S 0 be the minimal steepest descent direction at p. Note that p and p + e S 0 share a demanded bundle x due to the structure of our price space. Hence
and S 0 minimises this term if and only if S 0 contains all indices i ∈ [n] with t i < x i and no indices j ∈ [n] with t j > x j . In particular, we have S 0 := {i ∈ [n] | t i < x i } due to the minimal minimiser property of S 0 . If p has a unique demanded bundle x, which is easy to verify, it is straightforward to compute x. Hence, in this case we can determine the minimal steepest descent direction e S 0 without performing SFM. In the case that p has at least two demanded bundles, the demanded bundle x shared by p and p + e S 0 is unknown. However, if we define index sets I p and J p as
we have I p ⊆ S 0 and J p ∩ S 0 = ∅. Hence we can restrict ourselves to minimising the submodular function h :
T ∪ I p ) and reduce the dimensionality of the SFM problem from n to n − |I p ∪ J p |. The following lemma shows that computing I p and J p is cheap.
Lemma 3.9. I p and J p can be computed in time O(n|B|).
Proof. Note that
where we compute the minimum and maximum component-wise. Fix i ∈ [n]. The minimum min x∈D(p) x i is attained if no marginal bid selects good i. Hence
is non-marginal and demands i}.
Similarly, we claim that max x∈D(p) x i is attained if good i is selected whenever possible and thus max x∈D(p) x i is the sum of the weights of the bids for which i is demanded. Consider the price perturbation p defined by p i = p i and p j = p j + ε for j = i. Here ε > 0 is chosen sufficiently small so that every bid that is marginal on i at p is non-marginal and demands i at p , while every non-marginal bid demanding good i at p is also non-marginal and demands i at p . This perturbation corresponds to our proposed rule to compute max x i by selecting good i whenever possible.
Note that all bundles x at price p have the same number of items of i and are also demanded at p. As p ≤ p and p i = p i , the strong substitutes property implies that there exists x ∈ D(p ) such that x i ≤ x i for all x ∈ D(p). In other words, any demanded bundle x at p maximises x i .
Allocations to the separate bidders
Suppose we are given a market-clearing price p for target bundle t. We now present an algorithm that solves the allocation problem, i.e. finds a partition (t j ) j∈J of the target bundle t such that t j is demanded by bidder j at price p. We note that while the market-clearing price p returned by LongStepMinUp in Section 3 is minimal, our allocation algorithm works for any integral market-clearing price.
Our algorithm repeatedly simplifies the problem until it becomes vacuous. We generate a sequence of allocation problems by iteratively allocating parts of the target bundle to bidders and removing the corresponding bids from the bid lists until the residual target bundle is empty. If there are non-marginal bids or the allocation of items is unambiguous in some other way, a new allocation problem is obtained by removing the relevant items and their corresponding bids from the residual supply and bid lists. This is performed by Procedures 1 and 2, respectively, and constitutes an obvious measure of improvement. Otherwise a shift-project-unshift operation, performed by Procedure 3, simplifies the allocation problem by reducing the number of solutions to the allocation problem.
In order to describe our algorithm, we introduce the weaker notion of local validity for bid lists. This is used to define a generalised version of the allocation problem (see Definition 4.3), which also features a partial allocation bundle for each bidder as well as a residual target bundle. With each allocation problem we associate a corresponding marginal bids multigraph that we use to quantify our progress and establish the running time of the algorithm. Additionally, we introduce the derived graph as a tool to compute the parameters required for Procedures 2 and 3.
The generalised allocation problem
After allocating parts of the target bundle and deleting the corresponding bids, the bidders' bid lists may no longer be valid in the sense of Theorem 2.3. (Figure 4 gives an example of this.) Instead, we introduce the notion of local validity that only requires bid lists to be valid in the neighbourhood of the market-clearing price p. For prices p in this neighbourhood, we can define the demand correspondence D B (p) in the same way as for globally valid bid lists. Let B(p, ε) := {y ∈ R n | y − p ∞ < ε} denote the open ball with regard to the L ∞ -norm.
Definition 4.1. We say that a set of bids B is (locally) valid at p if there exists an open, convex neighbourhood P of p that satisfies the following equivalent criteria.
1. The indirect utility function f B restricted to P is convex.
2. There is no price vector p ∈ P and pair of goods i, i ∈ [n] 0 at which the weights of the bids marginal on i and i sum to a negative number.
For a set of bids B that is valid at p, define D B (p) to be the discrete convex hull of bundles demanded at UDRs adjacent to p. If P = B(p, ε) for some ε > 0, we say that B is ε-valid at p. The proof is given in Appendix B.
1. p ∈ R n+1 is a price vector with p 0 = 0, 2. for each bidder j ∈ J, B j is a list of bids in {0} × (Z + {0, 1 10 }) n that is locally valid at p, 3. the weight function w specifies the weights of all bids, 4. m j ∈ Z n+1 + for each j ∈ J is the partial allocation, 5. r ∈ Z n+1 + is the residual supply, and there exists a valid allocation (r j ) j∈J of the residual supply r to bidders, i.e. r j ∈ D B j (p) and j∈J r j = r. For any such valid allocation, we say that t j := r j + m j is a solution to A.
Note that the bids need not be integral and the bid lists for the bidders are only required to be locally valid at p. The intuition behind this definition is to capture the action of successively allocating items of the target bundle t to bidders. While these allocations may break global validity, they preserve local validity at p. For each bidder j ∈ J, the partial allocation m j is a bundle denoting the fraction of t already allocated to j, while r denotes the remaining part of t not yet allocated to any bidder. The 0-th coordinates of m j and r denote the number of reject goods (not yet) allocated.
Definition 4.4. We say that A is a valid reduction from A if A is an allocation problem and all solutions to A are also solutions to A.
In the initial problem, the residual supply is given by the target bundle and the partial allocation vectors are 0. Note that t 0 denotes the total number of rejected bids and can be computed as the total weight of bids minus the total number of items in t. In the vacuous problem, the bid lists are empty and the residual supply is 0.
Next we define the surplus gap of a bid b at p as the difference between the utility derived from a demanded good and the maximum utility derived from a non-demanded good. This allows us to describe the goods that b demands when we perturb the price or the bid by a small amount. Moreover, we see in Lemma 4.7 that the size of the neighbourhood around p in which a bid list is valid can be lower bounded by the surplus gaps of the bids in B.
Formally, let I = arg max i∈[n] 0 b i −p i denote the goods demanded by b at p. Then if I = [n] 0 , we define the surplus gap of b at p as
Observation 4.5. Suppose bid b demands goods I at p with a surplus gap of at least ε. Then for any price p ∈ B(p, ε/2), the goods I demanded by b at p form a subset of I.
Observation 4.6. Suppose bid b demands goods I at p with a surplus gap of at least ε. Then for any bid b ∈ B(p, ε/4) and price p ∈ B(p, ε/4), the goods I demanded by b at p form a subset of I.
Lemma 4.7. If B is locally δ-valid at p for some δ > 0 and all bids in B have a surplus gap of at least ε at p, then B is locally ε/2-valid at p.
Proof. We show that f B is convex on B(p, ε/2) by verifying that it satisfies midpoint convexity. Note that f B is linear on the line segment connecting p to q, for any q ∈ B(p, ε/2). Indeed, f B is the sum of terms w(b) max i∈[n] 0 b i − p i and it suffices to show that each term is linear. Hence fix b and define h(p) = w(b) max i∈[n] 0 b i − p i as well as r = θp + (1 − θ)q. By Observation 4.5, the goods demanded by b at q, r and p satisfy I q ⊆ I r ⊆ I p . Hence, for any i * ∈ I q , we have
Fix q, q ∈ B(p, ε/2) and choose θ > 0 so that r = θp + (1 − θ)q, r = θp + (1 − θ)q and (r + r )/2 are in B(p, δ). As f B is convex on B(p, δ), by assumption, we have
due to the linearity of f B on the line segments connecting p to q, q and (q + q )/2 . This implies midpoint convexity,
The marginal bids graph and the derived graph
With every allocation problem A, we associate a marginal bids multigraph and a derived graph. The marginal bids multigraph allows us to argue about the running time of our allocation algorithm, while the derived graph plays an important role in deciding whether to apply Procedure 2 or 3, and to determine the input parameters for these procedures.
Definition 4.8. The marginal bids graph G A associated with allocation problem A is an undirected edge-labelled multigraph whose vertices are the goods [n] 0 (including the 'reject' good). G A has an edge (i, i ) labelled with j if bidder j has a bid that is marginal at p between i and i .
A vertex is a link good if its incident edges are labelled with more than one bidder. Note that for any bidder j, the subgraph induced by all j-labelled edges is a simple graph, i.e. there is at most one edge labelled j connecting two goods i and i . A pair (I, j) with I ⊆ [n] 0 and j ∈ J is a key list if I is the set of vertices of some connected component of the subgraph induced by the j-labelled edges. We call a cycle in G A a multi-bidder cycle if it contains edges labelled by different bidders. A vertex in such a cycle is called a cycle-link good if its two edges in the cycle are labelled differently. Note that any multi-bidder cycle has at least two cycle-link goods.
Definition 4.9. The derived graph D A associated with allocation problem A is a simple bipartite graph whose two disjoint and independent vertex sets are the set of link goods and the set of key lists of G A . There is an edge between link good i and key list (I, j) if we have i ∈ I. Note that by the definition of link goods, every link good is adjacent to at least two key lists in the derived graph. Figure 3 gives an example of a marginal bids multigraph and its corresponding derived graph.
We describe a procedure to construct the derived graph in near-linear time O(α(n)n|B|) using a disjoint-union data structure. Here α(·) is the inverse Ackermann function, which grows extremely slowly and is near-constant in our context, as α(n) ≤ 4 for any n ≤ 2 2 2 2 16
. The disjoint-union data structure (cf. Tarjan and van Leeuwen [1984] ) maintains a representation of a set partition and admits a α(n)-time operation to merge two subsets of the partition. Internally, it assigns a distinct label to each subset of the partition and provides α(n)-time access to the label of the subset in which a given element lies.
First we show how to compute the key lists for each bidder. Fix a bidder j and initialise the disjoint-union data structure. For each bid b ∈ B j , compute the marginal goods S at prices p and, fixing any i ∈ S, merge the sets containing i and i for all i ∈ S \ {i}. Now the data structure has learnt the vertex partition induced by the connected components of G A in time O(α(n)n|B j |).
In order to recover this partition and express it as a family of sets, we initialise an empty 'labelled' family K of sets: each set in K will have an associated label. For each good in i ∈ [n], determine the label l of i's subset in the data structure. If there already is a set in K with label l, add i to this set. Otherwise, add the new singleton set {i} with label l to K. Finally, iterate through K and delete all singleton sets. This takes time O(α(n)n). Now K represents the family of key lists of bidder j. Hence in total it takes time O(α(n)n|B|) to compute the key lists for all bidders.
In order to compute the link goods, iterate through the key lists of all bidders and count the number of times each good appears. If a good appears at least twice, it is a link good. Once we know which good is a link good, we can compute the edges of the derived graph: for each key list (I, j), add an edge between (I, j) and each link good in I. Iterating through the key lists of all bidders takes O(nm) = O(n|B|) time.
The following subroutine FindParams takes as input an allocation problem and returns one of three possible outputs: a key list (I, j) with no link goods, a key list (I, j) with one link good i * , or a cycle-link good i * and the label j * of one of its incident edges in the multi-bidder cycle. The subroutine is used both to decide whether to invoke Procedure 2 or 3, and to compute the input for the respective procedure.
FindParams
Step 1 Compute the derived graph D A .
Step 2 If D A has an isolated key list vertex, return this key list (without a link good).
Otherwise, starting from any link good, find a maximal path that alternates between link good and key list vertices (without revisiting edges).
Step 3 Let i * and (I, j * ) be the last link good and key list visited, respectively. If the path is open, return (I, j * ) and i * . If the path is closed, return i * and j * .
Lemma 4.10. In time O(α(n)n|B|), FindParams returns a key list (I, j * ) with no link goods, a key list (I, j * ) with one link good i * , or a cycle-link good i * and the label j * of one of its incident edges in the multi-bidder cycle.
Proof. By construction of the derived graph, an isolated key list in D A contains no link goods, while a leaf key list contains exactly one link good. Hence if there is an isolated key list, the subroutine returns a key list without a link good. If the path found is open, the last vertex must be a leaf key list and the subroutine returns a key list with single link good. Now suppose the path is closed and consider only the cycle formed by alternating link good and key list vertices. Firstly, note that there is a path between consecutive link goods in the marginal bids graph G A using only j-labelled edges. Secondly, consecutive key lists have different bidder labels. These two observations imply that G A contains a simple multi-bidder cycle with cycle-link good i * and an incident edge labelled with j * .
Note that the path has length at most 2n by the pigeonhole principle. Hence constructing the derived graph, which takes time O(α(n)n|B|), dominates the running time.
Allocating unambiguous bids
Non-marginal bids Suppose bidder j has a non-marginal bid b at market-clearing prices p that demands good i ∈ [n] 0 in the allocation problem A. Then this bid contributes exactly w(b) ∈ {−1, 1} items of good i to any solution of A. Hence we can unambiguously allocate these items to m j and remove them from the residual supply r, thus accepting the non-marginal bid on the appropriate good. Procedure 1 below processes all non-marginal bids in this way. Note that while this operation may not preserve global validity of bid lists, the resulting lists remain locally valid at p, so that the result is a valid allocation problem. Figure 4 gives an example. Proof. Let A = [p, (B j ) j∈J , w, (m j ) j∈J , r ] be the output of Procedure 1. First we show that A is a valid allocation problem. Fix some j ∈ J. Since B j is locally valid by assumption, the indirect utility function f B j is convex in some small neighbourhood of p. Allocating a nonmarginal bid to bidder j corresponds to subtracting from the utility function f B j (q) the term max i∈[n] 0 (b i − q i ). In a sufficiently small neighbourhood of p, this term is linear, so the resulting utility function is also convex in some open neighbourhood of p.
It is straightforward to see that (t j ) j∈J is a solution to A if and only if it is a solution to A, so A is a reduction of A. To see that G A = G A , note that the marginal bids are unchanged. Hence all bids b ∈ B j I contribute an item of a good in I to bidder j's allocation bundle (in any valid allocation), while all other bids contribute an item of a good not in I.
Unambiguous marginal bids Let
If the key list (I, j) has no link goods, none of the bids by bidders other than j are marginal on I, so all items of goods i ∈ I in the residual supply must be allocated to j. Hence we can reduce our allocation problem by transferring r i items from the residual supply r to bidder j's partial allocation bundle m j and removing all bids from B j that are marginal on items in I.
If the key list (I, j) has a single link good i * , all items of goods in I \ {i * } must be allocated to j by the same argument as above. Secondly, the bids in B j marginal on goods in I must be allocated a total of b∈B gives us the number of items of i * that must be allocated to j and we can reduce our allocation problem as above and stated in Procedure 2. Step 2 Remove all bids marginal on I from B j .
Lemma 4.12. Procedure 2 returns a valid reduction of the input allocation problem in time O(n|B j |). Moreover, the marginal bids graph G A of A has strictly fewer edges than G A .
Proof. In order to see that A is a valid allocation problem, we verify that the new bid list (B j ) of bidder j after applying Procedure 2 is locally valid by checking criterion (2) of Definition 4.1.
Fix a price p and goods i, i . Recall that bids in B j cannot be marginal on goods in I and [n] 0 \ I, by the definition of key lists. If i ∈ I and i ∈ I, then B j has no bids marginal on i and i . If both i, i are goods in I, all bids marginal on i and i are removed by Procedure 2. If neither i nor i is a good in I, then none of the bids marginal on i and i are removed. As B j is locally valid by assumption, this implies that (B j ) is also locally valid.
It is straightforward to see that a solution to A is a solution to A, as the partial allocation performed by Procedure 2 is unambiguous. Finally, let i, i ∈ I and note that the marginal bids graph G A contains an edge between i and i that is not present in G A . As removing bids does not introduce new edges to the graph, G A has strictly fewer edges.
The shift-project-unshift reduction
Shifting bids Suppose all bids are integral and we shift some bidder's bids by a small quantity ε < 1/4 (we use ε = 1/10 for concreteness) in the direction of i by adding εe i to each bid vector. Then Lemma 4.13 and Proposition 4.14 together show that we can use SFM to find a price p ε ∈ p + εe S , S ⊆ [n] , at which the new allocation problem A with shifted bids and price vector p ε is a valid reduction.
Lemma 4.13. Fix ε with |ε| < 1/4 and j ∈ J. Let A be an allocation problem with integral bids and prices, and let A be obtained by replacing B j with (B j ) := b + εe i | b ∈ B j . Then the bid lists of all bidders in A are locally valid at any price p ε ∈ B(p, ε). Moreover, the bundles demanded by any bidder at p ε in A form a subset of the bundles they demand at p in A.
Proof. As the bids and prices in A are integral, each bid either demands all goods [n] 0 or has a surplus gap of at least 1 at p. By Lemma 4.7, all bid lists are 1/2-valid at p. This implies that every unshifted bid list is (1/2 − ε)-valid at p ε and the shifted bid list is (1/2 − 2ε)-valid at p ε .
By Observations 4.5 and 4.6, a non-marginal bid demands the same good for all q ∈ B(p ε , δ) and sufficiently small δ > 0. Hence a bidder will demand the same set of bundles at all nonmarginal prices in B(p ε , δ). As the bundles a bidder demands at p ε are by definition the discrete convex hull of bundles they demand at non-marginal prices infinitesimally close to p ε , we are done.
Proposition 4.14. Let A be an allocation problem with price vector p and fix ε with |ε| < 1/4. If we shift bidder j's bids by ε, there exists a price p ε ∈ p ± εe S , S ⊆ [n] , at which the residual supply r is demanded. We can determine p ε using submodular minimisation of the Lyapunov function g with regard to the aggregate bid list and the residual supply r.
The proof of Proposition 4.14 is given in Appendix B.
Projecting bids Next we define a projection operation on bids. The idea of this operation is to modify a bid b so that its surplus gap at p is increased. As a consequence, if that bid or the price is perturbed slightly, it "remembers" its preferred goods.
Let b be a bid and I = arg max i∈[n] 0 b i − p i be the set of demanded goods at price p. The projection b of b w.r.t. p is defined as follows.
Note that we allow for bid vector entries to be negative. Figure 5 illustrates the projection operation. Proof. Suppose all bids in B have a surplus gap of at least ε at p and B is locally δ-valid at p. Note that at any price q in the open ball B(p, ε) centred at p, every bid demands the same set of goods before and after projecting. Hence the projected bid list is locally min{δ, ε}-valid at p, and the set of bundles demanded at p, consisting of the discrete convex hull of bundles demanded in UDRs bordering p remains the same. The second statement follows from Observations 4.7 and 4.15.
Now we are ready to state the final procedure, which combines shifting and projecting to reduce the number of solutions of a given allocation problem.
cycle-link good i * and edge label j * . Output Allocation problem A .
Step 1 Add 1 10 e i * to each of j * 's bids and compute a new market-clearing price p ε = p + 1 10 e S * by solving S * = arg min S⊆[n] g r (p ± 1 10 e S ) using SFM.
Step 2 Project every bid set w.r.t. p ε .
Step 3 Subtract 1 10 e i * from each of j * 's bids and reset price to p.
The following analysis of Procedure 3 holds.
Lemma 4.17. The marginal bids graph G A of A has strictly fewer edges than G A .
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.18. Procedure 3 returns a reduction A of A in time O(T (n) + n|B|), where T (n) is the time it takes to minimise an n-dimensional submodular set function.
Proof. For convenience, let A i denote the allocation problem obtained after Step i. First we show that A 1 is a reduction of A. Indeed, by Proposition 4.14 and Step 1, the residual bundle r is aggregately demanded at p ε in A 1 . Furthermore, for any allocation (r j ) j∈J = (t j − m j ) j∈J of the residual bundle r at price p ε in A 1 , Lemma 4.13 implies that (m j + r j ) j∈J is a solution of A.
Lemma 4.16 implies that A 2 is a reduction of A 1 .
Finally, after
Step 3, the bid lists are locally valid at p by Lemma 4.13. Proposition 4.14 implies that the residual bundle r is demanded at some price p ∈ p ε ± εe S | S ⊆ [n] . Note that if a bundle is demanded at p , it is also demanded at [p ] due to the structure of our integral bid vectors, where [·] denotes the operation of rounding each component to the nearest integer. As [p ] = p, the result follows.
The allocation algorithm
The algorithm Allocate stated below combines Procedures 1, 2 and 3 in order to solve the allocation problem described in Section 2.4. We use FindParams as a subroutine to decide whether to call Procedure 2 or 3 in each iteration of the loop. Theorem 4.19 proves correctness and gives a running time bound of Allocate. We note that this bound is likely to be pessimistic.
Allocate
Input Initial allocation problem A. Output Target bundle allocation.
Step 1 Allocate all non-marginal bids with Procedure 1. If there are no more bids, return the partial allocation bundle m j for each bidder j ∈ J.
Step 2 Run the FindParams subroutine.
If it returns a key list (I, j * ) with at most one link good i * , apply Procedure 2. Otherwise (if it returns a cycle-link good i * and edge label j * ), apply Procedure 3. Go to Step 1.
Theorem 4.19. Allocate solves the allocation problem in time O n 2 |J|(α(n)n|B| + T (n)) , where T (n) is the time required to minimise an n-dimensional submodular set function.
Proof. By construction, the marginal bids graph of the initial allocation problem has at most |J| n+1 2 edges. Every call to Procedure 2 or 3 strictly reduces the number of edges (by Lemmas 4.12 and 4.17). Hence after at most |J| n+1 2 iterations of Step 2, the marginal bids graph of the current allocation problem is an empty graph, implying that there are no more marginal bids. In particular, at this point a single call to Procedure 1 allocates all remaining non-marginal bids and returns a vacuous allocation problem. As all three procedures return a reduction in the sense of Definition 4.4, the solution to the final vacuous allocation problem is also a solution to the original allocation problem.
To see the running time guarantee, note that FindParams and Procedures 1,2 and 3 are each called at most |J| Incorporating priorities The FindParams subroutine as stated in Section 4.2 is not fully specified, and different implementations may lead to different inputs for Procedure 2 or 3 when given the same allocation problem. If the input for Procedure 3 depends on the implementation used, ties may be broken differently and thus the target bundle is allocated differently among the bidders.
In order to control which input for Procedure 3 is returned, we propose the use of a priority list consisting of a permutation of all good-bidder pairs (i, j) ∈ [n] 0 × J. 14 This list may be given as an additional input parameter at the start of Allocate or be generated and updated dynamically as Allocate runs. The subroutine FindParams is replaced by PriorityParams, which returns the highest pair (i, j) in the priority list that constitutes a valid input to Procedure 3, or an input to Procedure 2 if no such pair exists. Recall that a pair (i, j) is a valid input for Procedure 3 if i is a cycle-link good in some multi-bidder cycle and j is the label of one of its edges in this cycle. This is the case if the derived graph D A has a cycle containing the edge from i to the key list (I, j) satisfying i ∈ I. For any (undirected) graph G and edge vw, one can check whether G has a cycle containing e by determining whether its endpoints v and w are connected in the graph G − e obtained by deleting vw using breadth first search (BFS). This implies the following subroutine.
PriorityParams
Step 2 For each pair (i, j) in the priority list:
If i is a link good and i ∈ I for some key list (I, j), check whether the edge from i to (I, j) lies in a cycle by temporarily removing the edge and checking (using BFS) whether the two endpoints are still connected in the graph. Return (i, j) if the edge lies in a cycle.
Step 3 Return some leaf key list (I, j) and the adjacent link good i.
To see that PriorityParams is well-defined, note that the priority list is a permutation of all possible pairs (i, j). Hence if the derived graph contains a cycle, the subroutine will return it, otherwise there exist at least two leaves for Step 2 to choose from. In practice, we can prune the priority list dynamically by removing pairs (i, j) once i is no longer a link good. This is possible because Procedures 2 and 3 do not add edges to the derived graph, and so a good cannot become a link good again at some later point.
Conclusions and further work
This paper has provided a practical process for running auctions in which bidders can express strong substitutes preferences using positive and negative bids. Previous work has shown [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019b ] that all strong substitutes preferences can be represented using appropriate combinations of these bids. Although the co-NP-completeness result we showed in Section 2.3 indicates that, at least in high dimensions, some restrictions may be needed on the allowed sets of bids, useful sub-classes of collections of bids are easily checkable for validity in practice, and can be checked offline, bidder by bidder, prior to the auction.
Our use of the product-mix auction's bidding language (by contrast with previous authors' usage of an abstract oracle) facilitates computing allocations as well as prices. One question for future research is whether we can also exploit the information provided by the bidding language to improve the computational efficiency of the pre-existing submodular function minimisation subroutine that both our price-finding and allocation algorithms use. Another obvious question is the extent to which our methods can be extended to broader classes of valuations. 
A Experiments
In order to evaluate the practical running time of our allocation algorithm, we run experiments on various numbers of goods, bidders and bids. We use our own Python implementation of the product-mix auction that is available at http://github.com/edwinlock/product-mix. Some effort was made to optimise for speed by exploiting fast matrix operations provided by the Numpy package (cf. [van der Walt et al., 2011] ). Furthermore, in an effort to implement submodular minimisation efficiently, the Fujishige-Wolfe algorithm was implemented in combination with a memoization technique to reduce the number of submodular function queries.
A.1 Generating test data
We describe a procedure to generate a valid list of positive and negative bids at points within the lattice [M ] n and a bundle x that is demanded in aggregate by these bids at prices p = 1 2 M e [n] in the centre of the lattice. In our experiments, we fix M = 100. The bids are generated in such a way that for parameter q at least q bids are marginal between two or more goods at p and we pick x such that p is the component-wise minimal market-clearing price vector. For any permutation π of [n], let p π = p + i∈[n] ε 2i e π(i) for some ε < 0.1. Note that a unique bundle is demanded at p π for any permutation π.
GenerateList(n, M, q)
Initialise Empty bid list B and bundle x = 0. Repeat q times:
Step 1 Pick a subset S of goods with |S| ≥ 2 from [n] 0 .
With probability 1/2, pick a positive bid that is marginal on goods S at p and add it to B. Pick any good i ∈ S uniformly at random and increment x i by one. Otherwise, generate a negative bid b that is marginal on goods S at p, as well as the following three positive bids. Pick two goods i, j ∈ [n] and add a bid at points b−λ i e i and b − λ j e j for some 1
and increment x by the bundle aggregately demanded at p π by the four bids just generated.
Step 2 If p is the component-wise minimal market-clearing price vector of x, return B. Otherwise repeat the algorithm. Generated in this way, every bid list has 2.5q bids in expectation. The procedure GenerateList is repeated for each bidder, so the total number of bids generated is B = 2.5qm.
Lemma A.1. The bid list generated by GenerateList is valid.
Proof. Note that the union of finitely many valid bid lists is again a valid bid list. Hence it suffices to show that the list consisting of one negative bid b and three positive bids b − λ i e i , b − λ j e j and b + λ1 is valid. To see this, apply Theorem 2.3 together with Theorem C.9.
A.2 Testing the algorithm
We run Allocate on allocation problems with bid lists generated by GenerateList for different numbers of goods n, bidders m and bids B. It should be noted that, as expected, the value of M has no discernable impact on the running time of the allocation algorithm and thus can be fixed to M = 100. We perform three pairs of experiments in which we vary one of the parameters n, m, q and fix the other two to realistic values.
1. For the first pair of experiments, we vary the average number of bids by running GenerateList with values q = 20, 40, 60, . . . , 500. We fix the number of bidders to m = 5 and the number of goods to n = 2 and n = 10, respectively.
2. For the second pair of experiments, we vary the number of goods from n = 10 to 50 in steps of 5 and fix q to 50 and 100, respectively.
3. Finally, the last pair of experiments varies the number of bidders from m = 2 to m = 20 in steps of 1 with two goods n = 2, while the bid numbers are fixed by setting q to 50 and 100, respectively.
For each data point (n, m, q), 50 allocation problems with n goods, m bidders and 2.5q bids per bidder (in expectation) are generated. The Allocate algorithm is then timed on each allocation problem and the average over all 50 times is recorded.
A.3 Results
The outcomes of the three pairs of experiments are shown in Figures 6 to 8 . The experimental data corroborates the running time bounds for Allocate given in Theorem 4.19: the algorithms is linear in the number of bids and quadratic in the number of goods. Figure 8 suggests that our algorithm runs in quadratic time on our generated allocation problems, which is in line with our theoretical bound, as the total number of bids B = 2.5qm is linear in m. Overall, we see that our allocation algorithm runs quickly even when presented with a large number of bids. Testing Allocate by varying the number B of bids for each bidder while keeping all other parameters fixed. We increase q from 10 to 500 in steps of 10, fix the number of bidders at m = 5 and set the number of goods to n = 2 (a) and n = 10 (b), respectively. We increase m from 2 to 20 in steps of 1, fix the number of goods at n = 2 and set q to 50 (a) and 100 (b), respectively.
B Additional proofs
We give some definitions that are used in the proofs below. Here and in the following, we use terminology and material developed in Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] and refer to the same for details.
Define the Locations of Indifference Prices (LIP) for a bid b as
Similarly, the LIP of a list of bids B is given by
Any L B can be decomposed into an (n − 1)-dimensional rational polyhedral complex Π B . We call the (n − 1)-dimensional polyhedra in this complex its facets. Endow every facet F of Π B with a weight, as follows:
Finally, we say that (Π B , w B ) is balanced if for every (n − 2)-cell G of Π, the weights w(F j ) on the facets F 1 , . . . , F l that contain G, and primitive integer normal vectors v F j for these facets that are defined by a fixed rotational direction about G, satisfy l j=1 w(F j )v F j = 0. Definition B.1 (cf. Baldwin and Klemperer 2019a, Definition 3.9). The strong substitutes vectors are those non-zero vectors in Z n which have at most one +1 entry, at most one −1 entry, and no other non-zero entries.
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3. The equivalence of 1 and 2 follows from Proposition 4.2 if we set P = R n . The implication 3 ⇒ 1 is well-known; see for instance Murota and Shioura [2014, Theorem 7 .3] for a stronger statement. We now show 2 ⇒ 3, using the Valuation-Complex Equivalence Theorem from Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] . Let (Π, w B ) be the weighted polyhedral complex associated with B. Note that as well as showing that balancing holds, we must also demonstrate that all weights of the polyhedral complex are positive, which is the setting for Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] . Observe first that every facet of Π B has a strong substitutes vector as its normal vector, as this property holds for any individual L b .
Note that the weighted polyhedral complex (Π b , w b ) associated with a single bid is balanced. If w(b) = 1 then this follows because (Π b , w b ) is the weighted polyhedral complex associated with a simple valuation for at most one unit of any good (and see [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019a, Section 2.3] ). This then extends to the case w(b) = −1 because changing the sign of the weights of all facets does not affect balancing. Then (Π B , w B ) is also balanced, as it is the complex corresponding to the union of balanced LIPs (see the proof of Lemma 3.13 in Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a] ).
Next we see that all weights of (Π B , w B ) are non-negative. Let F be a facet of Π B and fix a point p in the relative interior of F . Then, since the normal vector to F is a strong substitutes vector (and by Baldwin and Klemperer [2019a If w(b) is positive then L b has the property that facets and weights define all changes in demand between UDRs, [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019a, Section 2.2] , and it is easy to see that the same follows for negative-weighted bids, and thus extends by aggregation to our positive-weighted polyhedral complex (Π
for all UDR prices p ∈ R n , and hence for all prices, since u is concave and D B (p) is defined to be discrete convex.
We now show that f B = f u . For any bundle x, let p be a price at which x is demanded and let (i(b)) b∈B be a collection of goods allocated to the bids b ∈ B in order to obtain x. That is, i(b) ∈ D B (p) for every b ∈ B and x = b∈B w(b)e i(b) . Then we claim that
This then immediately implies f B (p) = f u (p) for any p ∈ R n , as
To see that (8) holds, let x and x be bundles demanded in neighbouring UDRs and let p be a price on the relative interior of the facet separating these UDRs. Moreover, let (i (b)) b∈B and (i (b)) b∈B be the allocation to bids at p that lead to bundles x and x . Then we have
and
Suppose (8) holds for bundle x and (i (b)) b∈B . Then (9) and (10) imply that (8) holds for x and (i (b)) b∈B . Finally, as u(0) = 0 = f B (0), this implies (8) for all possible bundles x, by induction. Finally, the strong substitutes property for u follows immediately from concavity of u and our observation above that all facets of Π B , and hence of L u , are normal to a strong substitutes vector [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2019a, Proposition 3.8] .
Observation B.2. Let f : [0, 1] → R be a continuous, piecewise-linear function. If its slope is non-decreasing as we move from 0 to 1, f is convex. This implies that if f is not convex, there exists a point λ at which two linear segments meet and the slope decreases.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall that f B restricted to P is convex if and only if
Suppose that p and q are two non-marginal prices in neighbouring UDRs such that for some λ ∈ (0, 1), the point r = λp + (1 − λ)q lies on the interior of a facet separating the UDRs. This implies two possibilities for each bid b ∈ B. Either b non-marginally demands the same good at p and q (and thus also at r). Or b non-marginally demands i at p and i at q, and is marginal (only) on i and i at r. Moreover, all bids of the latter kind are marginal on the same two goods.
Let B ii denote the bids that demand the set {i, i } at r. We show that f B satisfies (11) for p, q and any λ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if the weights of the bids marginal on i and i sum to a non-negative number, i.e. if b∈B w(b) ≥ 0.
By construction, we have
Hence the inequality
holds if and only if
Note that the term
is strictly negative, as b demands i and not i at q. Moreover, this term is the same for all bids b ∈ B ii , as i and i are both demanded at r. This implies by (13) that b∈B ij w(b) ≥ 0 if and only if (12) holds. Now we prove our main statement. Suppose f B restricted to P is not convex. Then there exist p, q ∈ P and λ ∈ [0, 1] that violate (11). Due to continuity of f B , we can perturb p and q slightly so that (11) is still violated, p, q are non-marginal and the line segment [p, q] crosses only interiors of facets of the LIP L B . We can assume wlog that p and q are in neighbouring UDRs; otherwise, we can apply Observation B.2 to find two non-marginal prices on the interior of the line segment for which (11) fails. Thus we can apply the above to see the implication 2 ⇒ 1.
For the converse (1 ⇒ 2), suppose there exist r and i, i ∈ [n] 0 such that the weights of bids marginal on i, i at r sum to a negative number. Wlog we can assume that all marginal bids at r are marginal only on goods i, i , by subtracting δe {i,i } from r for some infinitesimal positive value of δ if necessary. Hence r lies on the interior of a facet F and for small enough ε > 0, the points p = r + εe i − εe i and q = r − εe i + εe i lie in P and in neighbouring UDRs separated by F . By the above, this implies that p and q with λ = 1/2 violate (11) and we are done.
Lemma B.3. Suppose G is an invertible matrix whose rows are strong substitute vectors (Definition B.1). Then there exists a diagonal matrix U multiplying some (possibly empty) set of rows of G by −1, such that every column of U G contains exactly one +1 entry and such that the rows of (U G) −1 contain at most two non-zero entries, and all non-zero entries of (U G) −1 are +1.
Proof. Note that any vector of the form e i − e j for i = j has zero inner product with k e k and conclude that, since G is invertible, at least one row of G is ± a coordinate vector. So there exists an elementary row swapping operation T 1 , an elementary row multiplying operation U 1 which multiplies one row by either +1 or −1, and an elementary column swapping operation V 1 , such that T 1 U 1 GV 1 = G whose first row is e 1 . Note that all of these elementary matrix operations are themselves unimodular.
Because G is invertible we can apply the same logic to the matrix that remains when we strike the first row and column from G , obtaining a (n − 1) × (n − 1) submatrix whose first row is the first coordinate vector. These elementary operations may be extended to the original first row and column without changing the desired properties. Continuing in this fashion, we obtain an expression
is an lower triangular matrix with 1s along its main diagonal, where for all i, U i is an elementary row multiplying operation which multiplies a row by either +1 or −1 and T i , V i are elementary row and column swapping operations respectively. The rows of G (n) are still strong subsitute vectors and so any non-zero entries below the main diagonal are −1s.
It is clear that (G (n) ) −1 is given by the lower triangular matrix whose entries are the absolute value of the entries of G (n) . In particular, then, each row of (G (n) ) −1 contains at most two nonzero entries, and all non-zero entries of (G (n) ) −1 are +1. Now note that, by properties of elementary matrices, we may re-write T n U n · · · T 1 U 1 = T U in which T is a permutation matrix and U multiplies some (possibly empty) set of rows by −1. We may similarly write V 1 · · · V n = V where V is a permutation matrix. So G (n) = T U GV . Since T and V both simply permute rows and columns, we conclude that U G inherits from G (n) the property that each column contains exactly one +1 entry.
Thus
As the structure of permutation matrices are identical, whether they act on rows or columns, this implies that (U G) −1 inherits from (G (n) ) −1 the properties of each row containing at most two non-zero entries, and all non-zero entries being equal to +1.
Lemma B.4. Suppose that G is an invertible n × n matrix whose rows are strong substitute vectors (Definition B.1), and that H i is the ith column of H = (h ij ) n i,j=1 := 0 G 2 where we
Proof. By Lemma B.3 there exists a diagonal matrix U with +1 and −1 on its diagonal such that the rows of (U G) −1 contain at most two non-zero entries, and all non-zero entries of (U G) −1 are +1, and each column of U G contains precisely one +1 entry. Observe that
We may therefore replace G by U G for brevity in the proof.
But each row of G −1 contains at most two non-zero entries, all +1, so this is a stacked set of equations of the form g li = 0 or g li + g mi = 0 (with any indices l = m with exceptionally one which takes the form of either g ji = 1 or g ji + g ki = 1 (with some indices j = k). The latter case correponds to the ith row of G −1 . Since each g ji ∈ {−1, 0, 1} we conclude for the ith row that there exactly one non-zero entry in G i which is aligned to a non-zero entry in the ith row of G −1 , and this entry is equal to +1. Write this as g ji = 1, i.e. j is the row in G i of this entry.
Recall it follows that g ki {−1, 0} for k = j. Translating this across to G −1 H i , we find there are two cases:
If h ji = g ji = 1 then every incidence of "g li = 0" translates to "h li = 0" and so gives us a zero entry in H i ; and every incidence of g li + g mi = 0 either translates to h li + h mi = 0 or to h li + h mi = 1 (which holds if, w.l.o.g., g li = −1 but h li = 0; note that in this case it must follow that g mi = 1 and hence that m = j and hence by assumption that h mi = 1). That is, every entry in H i is either 0 or +1, and in particular the ith entry is 1.
But suppose h ji = 0 = g ji . It still holds that every incidence of "g li = 0" translates to "h li = 0". But now every incidence of g li + g mi = 0 either translates to h li + h mi = 0 or to h li + h mi = −1. For if w.l.o.g. g li = −1 then g mi = 1 and so m = j and h mi = 0 and hence h li + h mi ∈ {−1, 0}. That is, every entry in H i is either 0 or −1, and in particular the ith entry is 0.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that G is an n ×n matrix whose rows are strong subtitute vectors (Definition B.1) and that S ⊆ [n]. Then Ge S ∈ {−1, 0, 1} n and in particular Ge S ≥ −1 (the vector of 1s).
Proof. Each row of Ge S is the sum of a subset of the entries in the corresponding row of G, and so by definition of strong substitue vectors it is only possible that this is ±1 or 0. Proposition B.6. Suppose that we have two strong substitute integer-valued valuations, u 1 and u 2 . Fix i ∈ [n] and write u 2 [ε,i] for the valuation given by u 2[ε,i] (x) = u 2 (x) + εe i · x. For any r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z n suppose that there exists a price p * such that r 1 ∈ D u 1 (p * ), and r 2 ∈ D u 2[ε,i] (p * ). Then there exists a price p 0 such that r 1 ∈ D u 1 (p 0 ), and r 2 ∈ D u 2 (p 0 ). Moreover then, for any p such that r := r 1 + r 2 ∈ D u {1,2} (p), it follows that r 1 ∈ D u 1 (p), and r 2 ∈ D u 2 (p). Now take any p such that r := r 1 +r 2 ∈ D u {1,2} (p), and suppose that s j ∈ D u j (p) for j = 1, 2 with r = s 1 +s 2 : we have an equilibrium with potentially a different allocation of bundles across the two agents. By Mas-Colell et al. [1995, Proposition 2.F .1] we know that for j = 1, 2 we have (s j −r j )·(p−p 0 ) ≤ 0, with equality holding only if the agent is indifferent between both bundles at both prices. So, adding across j = 1, 2, we obtain ((s 1 + s 2 ) − r) · (p − p 0 ) ≤ 0, with equality holding only if the two agents are both indifferent between both bundles at both prices. But as s 1 + s 2 = r it must indeed follow that ((s 1 + s 2 ) − r) · (p − p 0 ) = 0 and so in particular that also rb j ∈ D u j (p) for i = 1, 2, as required.
Proof of Proposition 4.14. Re-label so that bidder j has valuation u 2 and the aggregate valuation from all remaining agents is u 1 . We know that r ∈ D u {1,2} (p) by definition of an allocation problem.
As in Proposition B.6 we write u 2[ε,i] for the valuation given by u 2[ε,i] (x) = u 2 (x) + εe i · x. Since both u 1 and u 2 [ε,i] are strong substitute valuations, there exists a price p * ∈ R n such that r ∈ D u 1,2[ε,i] (p * ), and thus there exist r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z n such that r 1 + r 2 = r and such that r 2 ∈ D u 1 (p * ), r 2 ∈ D u 2[ε,i] (p * ). By Proposition B.6 it follows that r j ∈ D u j (p) for j = 1, 2.
As in Proposition B.6 write P j for the set of prices p at which r j ∈ D u j (p ), and observe that the set of prices p at which r 2 ∈ D u 2[ε,i] (p ) is equal to P 2 + {εe i }. We know that p ∈ P 1 ∩ P 2 (so this is non-empty) and p * ∈ P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εe i }) (so this is non-empty). We seek p ε ∈ P 1 ∩(P 2 +{εe i }) with p ε ∈ p±εe S for some S ⊆ [n]; this is sufficient for r ∈ D u {1,2[ε,i]} (p ε ), as we require.
As at line (14) above we express both polyhedra as H i p ≥ A j , where rows of H j are strong substitutes vectors. Therefore P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εe i }) is defined by the set of inequalties:
Now, for j = 1, 2, let
be the subsystem of H j p ≥ A j consisting of all rows which hold with equality at p. (If both of these subsystems are empty then subsequent arguments will simply set p ε = p). Write so that
We wish to show that (17) holds for p = p ε . We can immediately observe that p ε − p = εG −1Ĥ i 0 . So, by Lemma B.4, either p ε = p+εe S for some S ⊆ [n] with i ∈ S, or p ε = p−εe S where S ⊆ [n] with i / ∈ S. Moreover, in either case, p ε − εe i ∈ {p ± εe S } for some S ⊆ [n]. We also immediately observe that p ε satisfies (20) with equality, and so p ε ∈ F . Thus by definition of F , also p ε satisfies (19). It follows by definition of (18) that, for every row in the original systems H j p ≥ A j that holds with equality at p, the corresponding shifted equation in (17) holds at p ε . It remains to show that this is also true for rows that are slack at p. Let (H j ) p ≥ (A j ) be the subsystems of such rows, for j = 1, 2, and observe that by integrality it follows that
Now, applying Lemma B.5 and (24) for j = 1, we obtain:
And applying Lemma B.5 to p ε − p − εe i , and (24) for j = 2
So, for every row in the original systems H j p ≥ A j that is slack at p, the corresponding shifted equation in (17) holds for p ε . This completes the proof that p ε ∈ P 1 ∩ (P 2 + {εe i }).
It follows that r ∈ D u 1,2[ε,i] (p ε ), which was constructed to be positioned relative to p as described in the proposition.
Finally, recall that the prices at which r is demanded are equivalent to the prices that minimise the Lyapunov function g(p) = f B (p) + r.p. It is known that f B (and thus g) are submodular [Murota and Shioura, 2014, Theorem 7 .2], so
are submodular set functions. Hence in order to determine a price p ε ∈ p + εe S | S ⊆ [n] at which r is demanded, we find minimisers S + and S − of h + and h − using SFM, then let
Note that we do not require minimal submodular minimisers to find p ε , and so this step takes 2T (n) time, where T (n) is the time is takes to perform submodular minimisation on h ± . We also note that finding p ε is analogous to finding a steepest descent direction in Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 4.17. First we show that every edge in G A is present in G A . To see this, fix some bid b and note by Observation 4.5 and Lemma 4.16 that Steps 1, 2 and 3 do not make b marginal on any new goods. Secondly we prove that for any multi-bidder cycle C with cycle-link good i * and incident label j * , Procedure 3 removes at least one of the edges of C from the marginal bids graph. Re-label the goods going around cycle C as 1, . . . , k, so that 1 = i * and so that bidder j * placed the bid marginal between goods 1 and 2. Also, for convenience, index the marginal bid that is marginal between goods i and i + 1 as "i", and index the marginal bid between goods k and 1 as "k". Thus b 1 ∈ B j * and b k / ∈ B j * . (In general the differently labelled bids need not be from different bidders). The existence of a marginal bid between goods i and i + 1 means that we have an equality
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and also
But if we take the sum of the first k − 1 equations, and cancel, we find
For any bid b in the multi-sets (B j ) j∈J of bids, fixed j * ∈ J and i * ∈ [n], let
Suppose we replace each bid b byb as above and recompute the prices. Since prices shift by at most 1 10 , a bid that is not marginal on a pair of goods, cannot become marginal on them. If we assume for a contradiction that all edges in C are all still present in G then we can write down similar expressions to (25) and (26) (w.r.t. new prices), then eliminate those prices obtaining a version of (27), namely
This is inconsistent with (27), so we have the required contradiction.
C Hardness of testing validity of unrestricted bid sets
Here we show that the question of whether a set of bids is valid is co-NP-complete. We also present a simple algorithm verifying the validity of a given list of positive and negative unit bids that runs in polynomial time if the number of goods, or the number of negative bids, is bounded by a constant. For any list of bids B, let B + and B − denote the positive and negative bids.
C.1 Checking validity is co-NP-complete
Definition C.1. Given a list of positive and negative bids B, the problem Valid Bids is to decide whether B is valid.
Theorem C.2 (Theorem 2.4). Valid Bids is co-NP-complete.
The proof of Theorem C.2 uses an equivalent definition of validity for the list of bids. Define regions in R n + that are generated by a point p and coordinates i, j ∈ [n] as follows.
We say that H p i or F p ij is negative for a list of bids if it contains more negative than positive bids, otherwise it is non-negative. (29) is transitive in the sense that, for any x, y, z ∈ R n + , • x ∈ H y i and y ∈ H z i , implies x ∈ H z i .
• x ∈ F y ij and y ∈ F z ij , implies x ∈ F z ij .
The following definition of valid bids restates the definition given in Theorem 2.3, 3., in terms of regions (28) On the basis of Definition C.5, the proof of Theorem 2.4 works by reducing the well-known NP-complete problem 3-CNF Satisfiability to Valid Bids by means of an intermediate NPcomplete decision problem More Negatives Dominated, which we define in Definition C.6. The NP-completeness of More Negatives Dominated is established in Theorem C.7 and the reduction from More Negatives Dominated to Valid Bids is given below as the proof of Theorem 2.4. For any two points x, y ∈ R n , we say that x dominates y if x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition C.6. Given two lists P and N of vectors in R n + , More Negatives Dominated is the problem of deciding whether there exists a vector z ∈ R n + that dominates more vectors in N than in P .
Theorem C.7. The problem More Negatives Dominated is NP-complete.
Proof. Note that verifying whether a given point z ∈ R n + dominates more vectors in N than in P can be done in polynomial time. This establishes membership of More Negatives Dominated in the class NP. We show completeness by reducing from 3-CNF Satisfiability. Recall that a boolean formula φ defined on n variables x 1 , . . . , x n is 3-CNF if
are its clauses and L i j ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n , x 1 , . . . , x n } are its literals. Here x i denotes the negation of x i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the three variables appearing in each clause are distinct. Given such a 3-CNF formula φ, first construct a pair of lists (P i , N i ) of vectors in R n + for each clause C i as follows. For notational convenience, e a...z denotes the characteristic vector e {a,...,z} of {a, . . . , z}.
• If C i = x a ∨ x b ∨ x c , let N i = {e ∅ } and P i = {e abc }.
• If C i = x a ∨ x b ∨ x c , let N i = {e ∅ , e abc } and P i = {e ab }.
• If C i = x a ∨ x b ∨ x c , let N i = {e ∅ , e ab , e ac } and P i = {e a , e abc }.
• If C i = x a ∨ x b ∨ x c , let N i = {e a , e b , e c , e abc } and P i = {e ab , e ac , e bc }.
Finally, let N be the sum of the N i and let P be the sum of the P i together with m−1 copies of e ∅ . This completes our reduction from 3-CNF Satisfiability to More Negatives Dominated. Clearly, P and N can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. To show correctness of the reduction, associate with every vector z ∈ R n + a truth assignment β z (on boolean variables x 1 , . . . , x n ) that sets x i to true if z i < 1 and false otherwise.
Observation C.8. Let z ∈ R n + be a point and β z be its associated truth assignment. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, z dominates one more point in N i than in P i if β z satisfies C i and an equal number of points in N i and P i if β z does not satisfy C i .
Suppose φ is a satisfiable 3-CNF formula with satisfying truth assignment β. Then define z ∈ R n + by
Hence β is the truth assignment associated with z. By Observation C.8, z dominates one more point in N i than in P i for each i, so due to the additional m − 1 origin points e ∅ added to P , z dominates exactly one more point in N than in P . Conversely, suppose there exists a point z ∈ R n + that dominates more points in N than in P , and let β z be its corresponding truth assignment. Then z dominates at least m more points in N than in m i=1 P i . By Observation C.8, we know that z dominates at most one more point in N i than in P i , which implies that this is the case for each i. Hence by the same observation, β z satisfies all clauses of φ and thus φ itself.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. In order to show that a list of bids B is not valid, it suffices to provide a certificate in the form of a point p and coordinates i, j ∈ [n]. We can verify in polynomial time whether H Clearly, B = B + + B − can be constructed efficiently. Note that all F x ij and all H x i with i = n + 1 are non-negative by construction. Indeed, fix F x ij and suppose it contains r negative bids. Then for each such bid (v, 1), where v ∈ N , there exists a positive bid (v, 1) + e [n+1] that is contained F x ij , so that is is non-negative. Analogously, for any H x i with i = n + 1, each negative bid (v, 1) has a corresponding positive bid (v, 0).
Further, a H x n+1 contain no negative points unless x n+1 = 1, the correctness of our reduction thus follows from the fact that z dominates r points from N and s points from P if and only if H x n+1 with x = (z, 1) contains r negative and s positive bids.
C.2 A simple algorithm testing validity
Given the co-NP-completeness result above, we cannot expect an efficient algorithm for the task of checking validity of a list of bids in the general case. Here we present a simple algorithm that tests validity of a given list of bids in polynomial time if the number of goods or the number of negative bids is bounded by a constant. Such constraints may be reasonable in certain economic settings. Our algorithm rests on Theorem C.9, which reduces the validity condition from Definition C.5 to a finite number of checks. Lemma C.10 reduces the number of checks further. Together, the two results immediately yield an algorithm whose running time is given in Theorem C.11. For any set of bids U , define the minimal dominating vector md(U ) of U as the componentwise maximum over U , md(U ) := b∈U b.
If all bids of U agree on some coordinate i (that is, if b i = b i for all b, b ∈ U ), they lie in H x i for large enough x, and md(U ) is the minimal such x so that H x i contains all points in U . Similarly, for any set of bids U and i ∈ [n], define mdF (i, U ) as mdF (i, U ) := min
If, for some i = j, the set U satisfies b i − b j = b i − b j for all b, b ∈ U , then the bids in U lie in F x ij for small enough x, and it follows from Observation C.3 that mdF (i, U ) = mdF (j, U ) is the maximal such x. Theorem C.9. A list of bids B is valid if and only if the following two conditions hold.
1. For every set U ⊆ B − of negative bids that agree on the i-th coordinate, that is b i = b i ∀b, b ∈ U , the region H md(U ) i is non-negative.
2. For every set U ⊆ B − of negative bids that satisfies b i − b i = b j − b j for all b, b ∈ U and some i = j, the region F mdF (i,U ) ij is non-negative.
Proof. The implication is immediate by Definition C.5. Conversely, suppose B satisfies the second condition. First we show that condition 1 of Definition C.5 is satisfied. Fix H x i , let U = B − ∩ H x i be the set of negative bids in H x i and y = md(U ). Then by construction, we have b ∈ H y i for all b ∈ U and y ∈ H x i . As H y i has |U | negative bids, it also contains at least |U | positive bids by assumption and by Observation C.4, these positive bids are also in H x i . Condition 2 is shown analogously. Fix F x ij , let U be the negative bids in this region and z = mdF (U ). Suppose b ∈ F z ij for every b ∈ U and z ∈ F x ij . Then Observation C.4 implies that F x ij is non-negative. To see that b ∈ F z ij for every b ∈ U , we verify the conditions of Observation C.3. Firstly, for all b ∈ U , as the difference b j − b i is the same for all b ∈ F z ij . Secondly, for any k ∈ [n] and b ∈ U , we have
We can verify z ∈ F x ij similarly.
Lemma C.10. For any list of negative bids U ⊆ B − there exists a list U ⊆ U with |U | ≤ n so that md(U ) = md(U ). Moreover, for each coordinate i ∈ [n], there exists a list U ⊆ U with |U | ≤ n + 1 so that mdF (i, U ) = mdF (i, U ).
Proof. Let U be a list of bids u 1 , . . . , u n , where u k is a bid from U that maximises the kth component, i.e. u k ∈ arg max v∈U v k . Then md(U ) = md(U ) by construction. Secondly, fix i ∈ [n] and let U be a list of bids u 1 , . . . , u n+1 , where u 1 ∈ arg min b∈U b i and u k ∈ arg max b∈U (b k − b i ) for k ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}. Then mdF (U ) = mdF (U ) by construction and we are done.
Algorithm for checking the validity of a list of unit bids B. For each subset U ⊆ B − of negative bids with |U | ≤ n + 1, and each i, j ∈ [n], verify the two conditions of Theorem C.9.
Theorem C.11. Our algorithm runs in time O |B − | n n 3 |B| . Moreover, if |B − | ≤ k or n ≤ k, the algorithm is polynomial in the input size n|B|.
Proof. There are |B − | n+1 subsets U of B − for the algorithm to iterate over, while there are n 2 possibilities for the index pair i, j. For each U and i, j, checking the conditions in Theorem C.9 takes n|B| time. This implies the running time.
Suppose the number of negative bids |B − | ≤ k is bounded by some k ∈ N. Then |B − | n+1 is constant and the running time of our algorithm is O(n 3 (|V | + |W |)). Secondly, if the number of goods n ≤ k is bounded, we have |B − | n+1 ≤ |B − | k+1 and hence a running time of O(|B − | k+1 |B|).
